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appearing in 47 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW 937-74 (1999)
INTRODUCTION
Fair division is a fundamental issue of legal policy. The law of remedies specifies
damages and rules of contribution that apportion liability among multiple defendants.1
Probate law specifies how assets from an estate are divided when the intentions of a
decedent are unclear.2 Family law specifies how assets from a dissolved marriage are
apportioned.3 Similarly, partnership law specifies how assets from a dissolved partnership
are apportioned.4 Bankruptcy law specifies how the assets of a debtor are apportioned
among creditors.5 In civil actions in which the plaintiff is successful but failed to mitigate,
the damages are apportioned between the defendant and plaintiff.6 When courts or
legislatures create or modify property rights they implicitly make choices about wealth
                                                          
† Associate Professor, Boston University Law School. I am grateful to Bob Bone, Nancy Staudt and Jim
Wooten for comments on this review.
1 See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic
Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980).
2 See generally Trust Decisions   Alleged Oral Agreement Among Heirs as to Division of Estate Could be
Enforceable without any Requirement of Court Approval, Hennessey v. Froehlich, 464 S.E.2D 246 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1995) 113 BANKING L.J. 848 (1996).
3 See generally Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian
Marriage? 84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998); Honorable Willis J. Zick, Divorce Law: Exclusions and
Disproportionate Divisions of the Marital Estate, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 519 (1993).
4 See generally Alan R. Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution – Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEX.
L. REV. 631 (1965).
5 See generally 1 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2D §3:12 (providing an overview of liquidation).
6 See generally Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1985).
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allocation.7 For some public projects the government apportions the cost of the projects
among users.8 Despite the importance of this issue, law professors have largely ignored9 a
small, but flourishing, band of economic theorists who study questions of fair division.10
In this book review I suggest a starting point for such analysis.
Hervé Moulin, the author of Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic
Introduction,11 and H. Peyton Young, the author of Equity: In Theory and Practice,12 are
two of the economic theorists working to move the study of fairness into the mainstream
of economic analysis. In the introduction to his book, Moulin laments: “To the majority
of economists today, the ethical choices of distributive justice are alien to economic
analysis….The standard view simply incorporates … concerns about justice (distributive
and otherwise) in the description of individual characteristics: some of us derive utility
from giving to the needy, some of us do not.”13 It is no surprise that fairness does not play
a significant role in law and economics since it does not play much of a role in any area of
                                                          
7 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
8 See infra text accompanying note 55.
9 See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 461-63 (1992) (devoting only two pages to a
discussion of distributive justice); NICHOLAS MERCURO AND STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 188-89 (1997) (arguing that the efficiency focus of economics
carries over to law and economics).
10 Four Nobel prize winning economists who have studied fairness issues are: AMARTYA K. SEN,
COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985) (discussing the moral status of preferences in welfare economics);
Kenneth Arrow, Rational Choice Functions and Orderings, 26 ECONOMETRICA 121 (1959) (noting the
aggregation of individual preferences by a social preference ordering); John Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in
Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953); John Harsanyi,
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisions of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 302
(1955) (foreshadowing Rawls with a theory of distributive justice based on average expected utility
maximization behind a veil of ignorance); and John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155
(1950) and Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 128 (1953) (discussing fairness in
bargaining problems).
11 HERVÉ MOULIN, COOPERATIVE MICROECONOMICS: A GAME-THEORETIC INTRODUCTION 8 (1995).
12 H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994).
13 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 8. Cf. Henrik Lando, An Attempt to Incorporate Fairness into an
Economic Model of Tort Law, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 575 (1997) (building taste for fairness into the
preferences of injurers and victims).
3
applied economics.14 I hope my review of these two books will pique some interest in this
subject and promote legal scholarship that incorporates fairness into the economic
analysis of law.15
The main topic of the two books is the microeconomic analysis of methods for
fairly allocating benefit and cost. The authors are eclectic and do not insist on a single
preferred mode of fairness analysis. Moulin advocates a three-pronged approach that
combines some notion of end-state justice with procedural requirements related to
voluntary participation and voluntary disclosure of personal information.16 Young also
discusses procedural and end-state justice in various economic models, but does not
suggest a unified theory.17 In both books, procedural questions are subsidiary to end-state
questions. Procedure is usually studied in the following terms: Given method X achieves
desirable results in terms of end-state justice, can we find a way to implement X that
                                                          
14 See generally EDWARD ZAJAC, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 76 (1995) (noting that economists split
efficiency from fairness analysis and leave the consideration of fairness to policy-makers).
15 My Westlaw search found no citations to the book by Moulin. The book by Young was cited by the
following five authors: Richard O'Brooks, Legal Realism, Norman Williams, and Vermont’s Act 250, 20
VT. L. REV. 699 (1996); Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-offs in
Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1481 (1995); Ugo
Mattei, Efficiency as Equity: Insights from Comparative Law and Economics 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 157 (1994); Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default
Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339 (1998); and Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage? 84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998). I frequently attend
meetings of the American Law and Economic Association and I have never witnessed a presentation that
used the cooperative microeconomic analysis that I will describe in this book review.
16 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 3 (“I submit that cooperation between selfish economic agents can be
conceived in three fundamental “modes,” namely, direct agreement, justice, and decentralized behavior.”)
He also contends that an ideal cooperative mechanism should be just, stable, and implementable via a
unique equilibrium. Id. at 4.
17 Young argues that allocation methods tend to follow one of three conceptions of fairness (he uses the
term equity): parity, proportionality, or priority. See YOUNG, supra note 12 at 8. Parity corresponds to equal
treatments of equals. Priority is invoked as the fair way to address the allocation of indivisible goods. The
good is given to the party with the highest priority based on some measure of merit. See id.
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allows the affected parties to participate voluntarily, subject to reasonable constraints on
the government’s behavior?18
As in Moulin and Young, most of my comments in this review concern end-state
justice. The two simple allocation methods that serve as the starting point for the analysis
of end-state justice find their origin in the Aristotelian theory of distributive justice: equal
cost (or benefit) sharing and proportional cost (or benefit) sharing.19 Consider the
following illustration. A man wins the lottery and decides to make a gift of $1 million to
his divorced parents. He could choose equality and give one-half million dollars to each,
or he could choose proportionality and give $600,000 to his mother in recognition that her
life expectancy is fifty percent longer.
Moulin and Young consider many variations on both themes and insist that there
is no single fair method of division. Each new context demands a new analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages of different methods. For example, if we change the
context of the son’s fair division problem by awarding him a car rather than cash in the
lottery, his new division problem is more difficult.  The car is not divisible. He might sell
the car and divide the proceeds as above. But that approach is not always acceptable. No
market exists for some items, such as organs available for transplant.20 Furthermore, the
market may not capture the idiosyncratic valuation of an item.21 Suppose that the car is a
                                                          
18 Fair process is discussed in Part V.
19 According to Aristotle, equal treatment is required when individuals are the same in terms of merit or
blame. When individuals differ in a morally relevant way (for example, some work harder, or some are
more costly to serve) then benefit or cost should be allocated in proportion to some factor that captures the
difference. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 64; ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 105.
20 Young devotes two chapters to the fair allocation of indivisible benefits. He chooses topics like the
allocation of organs for transplants and the apportionment of legislative seats to illustrate his discussion. See
YOUNG, supra note 12, at 20-62.
21 See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON, AND JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST 629-52 (1992) (developing methods for valuing life and other non-market commodities). Cf.
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unique antique that the mother would dearly love to own. Also suppose the father would
prefer cash. What’s a poor son to do? Should he try to equalize the monetary value of his
gifts or their utility value? Is it possible to compare the happiness of his mother and
father? What if he cannot afford a large cash gift to his father if he gives the car to his
mother?
As the son’s quandary suggests, several difficulties plague the analysis of fair
division. There are many ways to formulate the rule that a fair share should be responsive
to relevant differences. The correct definition of proportional sharing is not obvious when
there are heterogeneous individuals who differ in many morally relevant respects.22 The
correct definition is also not obvious when there are many choices about how to measure
differences.23
Once a fair end-state is chosen there are still more difficulties. First, methods that
yield attractive end-states might be associated with coercive or undemocratic
procedures.24 Second, methods that are attractive in a world of full information might not
be feasible in a world where participants cannot be induced or trusted to disclose relevant
private information.25 Finally, methods that give fair end-states through fair and feasible
processes may generate perverse economic incentives.26 Moulin and Young persevere
                                                                                                                                                                            
Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (discussing problems with
commodification and assignment of market value); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 43 DUKE. L. J. 56 (1993) (noting problems with market valuation of bodily integrity).
22 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 9 (indicating one problem with a proportional rule is that there are different
possible scales that can be used for measurement).
23 See id.
24 See Herve Moulin, Procedural cum Endstate Justice: An Implementation Viewpoint, unpublished
manuscript 11-12  (March 1997) (on file with Buffalo Law Review).
25 See e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 256-59 (1984).
26 See infra text at Part IV.
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despite these difficulties. They show the reader how to devise satisfactory division
methods that cope with the features of a particular context.
One of the most attractive features of these books is that both authors focus on
local rather than global issues of fairness.27 Other economic analyses of fairness pursue
global questions such as the nature of a just society or the ideal social contract.28 In
contrast, Young states that “this book…is about the meaning of equity in concrete
situations that we meet every day.”29 He distinguishes his work from  global theories by
observing “theories of justice in the large have little to say about what it means in the
small. They do not tell us how to solve concrete, everyday distributive problems such as
how to adjudicate a property dispute, who should get into medical school, or how much
to charge for a subway ride.”30 Local theories of justice recognize that law and policy are
                                                          
27 See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 6 (1983) (“I want to argue…that the principles of
justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different social goods ought to be distributed for different
reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive
from different understandings of the social goods themselves—the inevitable product of historical and
cultural particularism.”) Id.
28 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at xi. A central problem for political philosophers is the social contract and a
just social order. Much of the interesting work in economic theory that explores fairness issues is couched
in terms of the social contract, and is responsive to the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau, Nozick, and Rawls.
See generally ZAJAC supra note 12; KEN BINMORE, PLAYING FAIR: GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT (1994); KEN BINMORE, JUST PLAYING: GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1998);
DANIEL M. HAUSMAN AND MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
(1996).
 The other main strand of economic theory related to fairness arises from the Fundamental
Theorems of Welfare Economics. See e.g., VARIAN, supra note 25, at 198-203. The First Theorem provides
conditions under which a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. The Second Theorem states that any
competitive equilibrium can be implemented by the proper specification of property rights. Law and
economics scholars rely on the Second Theorem to justify legal analysis that bifurcates efficiency and
fairness analysis of the law. The usual attitude is that law should be shaped by efficiency concerns, and the
legislature can achieve fairness through taxation and spending policies. See infra text at Part IV. I will
justify the local analysis of justice developed by Young and Moulin below by arguing that the usual appeals
to the Second Theorem are unpersuasive in terms of microeconomics and in terms of political economy.
Furthermore, I argue that fairness depends on more than the distribution of income. Economic analysis of
the law needs to pay attention to fairness concerns that arise when all of the parties affected by a law have
similar income and wealth, but differ in other morally significant dimensions.
29 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at xi.
30 Id. at 6.
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often compartmentalized; there are few chances for compensation across different
problems of fair division.31
In this review I intend to introduce the reader to some valuable tools for analyzing
concrete problems of distributive justice. The tools are found in cooperative
microeconomics; especially cooperative game theory. I will illustrate the value of these
tools by showing how they can be applied to legal policy issues. I hope to convince the
reader that these methods deserve greater attention in the practice of law and economics.
 There are at least three roles for fairness analysis in law and economics:32 (1) for
many cooperative activities, incentive problems are minimal and fairness is the only way
to guide the allocation of cost and benefit;33 (2) when Coasean conditions of low
transaction costs prevail,34 then property rights should be allocated according to fairness
criteria;35 and (3) when policymakers want to consider efficiency and fairness objectives
simultaneously, then an explicit description of fairness criteria allows an explicit trade-
off.36 This book review will touch on all of these roles for fairness analysis. I work
through two estate division problems that do not present any incentive or efficiency issues
in Part I. I move to more complicated problems of fair division in Part II wherein property
rights and efficiency issues are introduced. In Part III, I discuss the axiomatic basis of the
methods of fair division that are invoked in Part II. I address the question of how
                                                          
31 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 6-7.
32 Another role for fairness criteria is prediction of the outcomes of social choices or bargains, especially
when fairness can be used as a focal device to choose among multiple equilibria.  Since I am interested in
normative issues, I do not consider that role. See ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 7, 102-104 (discussing the
positive use of fairness in the study of the political economy of regulation).
33 Part I gives two examples of estate division problems in which no efficiency issue is apparent.
34 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
35 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 4-5 (arguing that equity should guide the assignment of rights to newly
created property and property that is excluded from the market); MOULIN, supra note 11, at 164 (indicating
that questions about new property rights recur because of technical and economic change)
8
traditional efficiency analysis in law and economics can be integrated with fairness
analysis in Part IV. I conclude in Part V with comments about procedural fairness and
economic analysis.
As one final preliminary matter, I must comment on the accessibility of these
books. Young claims “the text is intended to be a ‘primer’ and does not presuppose any
mathematical background, though a taste for logical argument and some familiarity with
economic concepts would certainly help,”37 and Moulin claims “this book is elementary
and self-contained.”38 When I was a graduate student in economics I was always skeptical
about such comments.39 Of course, since I am urging law professors to read these books, I
do believe they are accessible. However, Young is a significantly easier read than Moulin.
Most of the economics in Young is no more difficult than the economics that follows in
this Review. The same cannot be said about Moulin’s book, which is targeted at an
audience with significant economics training. Nevertheless, the first chapter of Moulin’s
book is a delight to read and is accessible to all readers. Readers without strong
economics training will have to be content to skim the rest of the book.
I. TWO EXAMPLES OF ESTATE DIVISION
                                                                                                                                                                            
36 The trade-off between efficiency and fairness is covered in Part IV.
37 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at xiii.
38 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 4.
39
 A formative experience for me in graduate school involved reading the famous Theory of Value. The
book begins with the reassuring comment: “This chapter presents all the mathematical concepts and results
which will be used later… Its reading requires, in principle, no knowledge of mathematics.” GERARD
DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE 1 (1959) (italics in original). Needless to say, the chapter and the whole book
was a struggle.
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The following two examples of the fair division of an estate illustrate many of the
issues central to the economic analysis of fairness. Example one displays three possible
fair solutions to the basic problem of dividing money between two parties. The
multiplicity of solutions shows that the choice of a reference point for evaluation of
fairness is critical. The example also shows that the choice of which factor is morally
relevant to a fair distribution will sometimes be sufficient to determine how the money is
allocated. Example two modifies example one by replacing money with personal
property. This introduces the issues of idiosyncratic valuation and interpersonal utility
comparison. I also allude to two problems involved in implementing a fair division:
wealth constraints and private information.
A. Example one.40
Xerxes dies and leaves an estate of $300. He has told his priest to divide the estate
between his friends Yves and Zack in accordance with instructions in a note he gave the
priest. Regrettably, the priest finds out that the instructions direct him to give $200 to
Yves and $300 to Zack. The priest considers three possible fair divisions of the estate.41
First, he could choose an egalitarian solution and give an equal amount of $150 to both
men.42 Second, he could give $100 to Yves and $200 to Zack. The justification for this
division is that Zack has an exclusive claim to the last $100 in the estate so that $100
should go to Zack. The first $200 in the estate can then be divided equally. The
dissatisfaction of Yves and Zack is equalized in the sense that both men are $100 short of
                                                          
40 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 67.
41 I assume that the priest cannot discern anything more about Xerxes’ intention.
42 Equal division would be unattractive if Yves’ claim was only $100 in which case equal division would
give him more than he was left in the note.
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their claims.43 Comparing the first two solutions, it is easy to recognize a shift in a
background assumption. The first solution uses a reference point in which Yves and Zack
have nothing. The second solution uses a reference point in which both have their claims
fully satisfied.44 As a third possibility, the priest could follow probate law and abate the
bequests in proportion to the claims.45 In such a case, Yves gets (2/5) of $300, or $120
and Zack gets (3/5) of $300, or $180.
B. Example two.46
Xerxes dies and leaves a painting to Yves or Zack. The priest is told to do
whatever seems fair. The painting has a market value of $400. Yves attaches a higher
value of $1000 to the painting because of sentimental reasons. Zack only cares about the
painting for its resale value. The first solution that occurs to the priest is for Yves to
receive the painting and give $500 to Zack. The justification is that both men gain $500
in value. The priest reconsiders when Yves complains that he does not have $500 to give
Zack. Yves also mutters something about really only valuing the painting at $410. The
priest disregards Yves’s claim that he only values the painting at $410 because he can see
in his eyes that Yves really values it at $1000. The priest decides on a second solution in
which Yves receives the painting and gives $200 to Zack. The new justification is that
both men suffer a loss of $200 compared to what they would enjoy if they each somehow
got an equivalent painting. Yves likes this proposal better and comes up with the $200.
                                                          
43 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 67-69 (noting that this allocation method comes from the Talmud and is
called the contest garment rule).
44 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 75-76 (noting that assessments of equality depend on the choice of a
baseline and a yardstick).
45 See WEST’S ANN. CAL. PROB. CODE §21403 (1999) (indicating that pro rata abatement is used within a
class of beneficiaries).
46 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 20-22.
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Zack grumbles but acknowledges that $200 is half of the market value of the painting.
Nevertheless, he still thinks that Yves is getting the better deal.47
A division problem as simple as example two raises a host of issues about
choosing a fair end-state and also about how to achieve that end-state. An efficiency issue
appears – the painting is worth more to Yves than to Zack. Later in this review I will
comment on trade-offs between efficiency and fairness,48 but here I am content to observe
that efficiency itself may be a fairness consideration: Yves should get the painting
because he values it more.49 Of course, the very question of how much Yves values the
painting is also an important issue. How can a fair end-state be achieved when parties
hold private information? I assumed that the priest knew Yves’ valuation – normally the
judge, jury, arbitrator or legislature will not have all the relevant information they need to
choose a fair outcome.50 The issue of a wealth constraint also surfaces in example two. Is
it fair to give the painting to Yves if he cannot or is not willing to make some payment to
Zack? Finally, we must confront the classic issue of interpersonal comparison. It is
possible to make some headway in resolving fairness questions without making such
comparisons,51 but the exposition is easier and the methods are more powerful if we
                                                          
47 Moulin points to one other fair division in which Yves takes the painting and pays $350 to Zack. This
allocation equalizes the gain of risk neutral parties in comparison to a benchmark in which either Yves or
Zack gets the painting with one-half probability. See id. at x.
48 See infra text at Part IV.
49 This would advance a utilitarian and perhaps other notions of fairness.
50 See generally Bengt Holmstrom & Roger Myerson, Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with
Incomplete Information, 51 ECONOMETRICA 1799 (1983) (discussing a social planner’s problem in the face
of private information).
51 An allocation is envy-free if no person prefers the allocation given to someone else. See YOUNG, supra
note 12, at 11. The role for this notion of equity is limited because it assumes that everyone has an equal
claim to whatever is being allocated. Id. Compare STEVEN J. BRAMS AND ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION:
FROM CAKE CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1-2 (1996) (indicating that envy-free methods of fair
division are central to their analysis).
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allow comparisons. Thus my presentation follows the usual welfare economics
tradition.52
II. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
One economic approach to dividing cost and benefit relies on cooperative game
theory. A cooperative game consists of a list of players and a characteristic function.53
The characteristic function indicates what payoff should be assigned to every conceivable
coalition of players. A coalition is any set of players, including singletons and the entire
set of players. There are different possible interpretations of the characteristic function. I
will return to the estate division examples to illustrate some cooperative games and
explain their characteristic functions.
The cooperative games that describe the two estate division examples are similar.
The list of players is Y and Z (short for Yves and Zack). The characteristic function, v( ),
associates a payoff with each coalition: {Y}, {Z}, {Y,Z}, and the empty set 0. One





                                                          
52 See id., at 12-13 (rejecting utilitarianism in the sense of comparing people’s happiness but says that
interpersonal comparisons must be made).
53 See id. note, at 85; MOULIN, supra note 12, at 402-427; MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 127-130 (1982).
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The interpretation of v(Y) = 200 is that Yves could get $200 from the estate if Zack did
not exist. Similarly, Zack could get $300 if Yves did not exist. Of course, the coalition
with no players creates no value. And finally, the pair can cooperate and share the whole






Given the specification of a cooperative game, the economist uses a solution
concept to determine the fair division of cost or benefit between the players. Different
solution concepts are available. The leading solution concepts can be justified in terms of
their axiomatic origin. In this Part of the review, I will introduce two solution concepts
and in Part III I will explain the axiomatic approach to constructing a solution concept.
Essentially, a solution concept is a way to generalize the Aristotelian
proportionality principle. The two most popular solution concepts are the Shapley value
and the nucleolus. The Shapley value determines the average marginal benefit or cost
associated with each player in each possible coalition, and allocates that amount to each
player.54 The nucleolus, instead, picks the allocation that minimizes the dissatisfaction of
all possible coalitions of cooperating individuals.55
Let me apply the Shapley value solution concept to the first estate division
problem. I will start with the allocation to Yves. There are two possible coalitions that
                                                          
54 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 69-71; See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 417-423.
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include Yves: {Y} and {Y,Z}. The incremental benefit that Yves brings to the coalition
{Y,Z} is zero, because Zack alone gets v(Z) = 300 which is the same as the payoff to the
pair, i.e., v(Y,Z) = 300. The marginal benefit that Yves brings to the coalition {Y} is 200,
because v(Y) = 200 and the payoff is zero to the empty coalition, i.e., v(0) = 0. The
Shapley value allocation to Yves is the average of 0 and 200 or 100. Similarly, the
Shapley value for Zack averages the marginal contributions made by Zack: namely, v(Z)
– v(0) = 300, and v(Y,Z) – v(Y) = 100. Thus his Shapley value allocation is 200.
The nucleolus gives the same allocation for this problem. A payoff of 100 to Yves
and 200 to Zack minimizes the dissatisfaction of the various coalitions. The
dissatisfaction of the coalition {Y} is measured by the gap between the payoff specified
for Y by the characteristic function v(Y) = 200 and Y’s actual allocation of 100. So Yves
gets 100 less than he is “entitled to” according to the characteristic function. Similarly,
Zack gets 100 less than v(Z) =300. The coalition of Yves and Zack gets a total allocation
of $100 + $200 = $300 which just matches the payoff specified by the characteristic
function: v(Y,Z) = 300. There is no way to rearrange the allocation of the estate between
Yves and Zack so that the dissatisfaction of at least one coalition falls, and no coalition
grows more dissatisfied. Thus we have the nucleolus.
Compare these results to the discussion of example one in Part I. In example one,
the priest considered giving the uncontested $100 portion of the estate to Zack and
dividing the remaining $200 equally (yielding an allocation of $100 to Yves and $200 to
Zack).  The discussion of cooperative games shows the same allocation can be derived
using the appropriate game and either the Shapley value or the nucleolus solution
                                                                                                                                                                            
55 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 93-96.
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concept. As the reader might expect, the other allocations considered by the priest can
also be derived as solutions to a cooperative game. For example, the allocation that splits
the estate equally and gives $150 to both Yves and Zack comes from a cooperative game
in which v(0) = v(Y) = v(Z) = 0, and v(Y, Z) = 300.56 The interested reader can also
verify that cooperative games can be specified that have solutions that correspond to the
two allocations considered by the priest in the second estate division example.57
The Shapley value and the nucleolus are not merely obscure inventions by game
theorists. The Shapley value has been derived independently by non-economists in two
real-life settings. First, civil engineers developed a similar scheme to allocate dam
construction costs by the Tennessee Valley Authority.58 Engineers estimated the costs
associated with an actual dam and also with hypothetical dams that would be built to
serve the various possible coalitions of users. The actual costs were then allocated to
users based on a method that approximated the Shapley value. More surprising perhaps,
distributors of used machinery devised an ingenious scheme to allocate the surplus
created by their collusion at auctions.59 After official auctions ended, the colluding
                                                          
56 Instead of giving the singleton coalitions the payoff that they would receive if the other claimant did not
exist, in this cooperative game I assume that neither claimant can take anything from the estate without the
permission of the other. Therefore, v(Y) = v(Z) = 0.
The priest also considered a proportional allocation in example one that gave $120 to Yves and
$180 to Zack. A natural specification of the characteristic function also produces that outcome. Suppose
that by acting alone Yves could hire a lawyer at a cost of 100 and win a payment of 120 in a probate
proceeding. Similarly, Zack could hire a lawyer at a cost of 100 and win a payment of 180. Then v(Y) = 20
and v(Z) = 80, and the Shapley value or nucleolus give $120 to Yves and $180 to Zack.
57 In example two consider the following characteristic function: v(0) = 0, v(Y) = 1000, v(Z) = 400, and
v(Y,Z) = 1000. The nucleolus and Shapley value both yield an allocation in which Yves gets 800 and Zack
gets 200. Alternatively, consider the characteristic function: v(0) = 0, v(Y) = 0, v(Z) = 0, and v(Y,Z) =
1000. The nucleolus and Shapley value both yield an allocation in which Yves gets 500 and Zack gets 500.
58 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 86.
59 See Daniel Graham, Robert C. Marshall, & Jean-Francois Richard, Differential Payments within a Bidder
Coalition and the Shapley Value, 80 AMER. ECON. REV. 493 (1990). The bidders involved in the collusive
ring were ultimately detected and prosecuted. See U.S. v. Seville Industr. Mach. Corp., 696 F. Supp. 986
(D. N. J. 1988).
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bidders gathered and held a series of private (and illegal) auctions open only to ring
members to allocate the machinery won by the collusive ring and to allocate the financial
gains derived at the expense of the auctioneer. These private auctions were designed in
such a way that the collusive gain was allocated to ring members according to the Shapley
value.60
The nucleolus is a generalization of the contested garment rule that appears in the
Talmud as a rule for fair division.61 The contested garment rule first appears in the
Babylonian Talmud nearly 2000 years ago, where its name derives from the following
problem: “Two hold a garment; one claims it all, the other claims half. What is an
equitable division of the garment?”62 The answer given in the Talmud is ¾ to the party
claiming the whole garment and ¼ to the other. Because there is no dispute that the first
claimant is entitled to half, the remaining, disputed portion is divided equally.63 Other
Talmudic writings extend this procedure to estate division and partnership dissolution
problems with three claimants.64
The Shapley value and the nucleolus give the same allocation in the two-claimant
estate division problems in Part I. In general, however, the Shapley value and nucleolus
yield different solutions to cooperative games. Take, for example, the problem of
apportioning damages among three polluters. Suppose that Xerxes, Yves, and Zack
independently took actions that contaminated land owned by Wilma. The pollution
                                                          
60 See Graham et al., supra note 58.
61 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 93-96
62 See id., at 65.
63 I can illustrate the cooperative game associated with this problem by designating the party claiming the
whole garment A, and the other claimant B. Let v(A) = 1, v(B) = ½, and v(A,B) = 1. The numbers represent
a fraction of the garment. The outcome in the Talmud is the nucleolus and  the Shapley value for the
cooperative game. When there are more than two players the contested garment rule generalizes to the
nucleolus not the Shapley value.
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destroyed the value of the land and caused a loss of 400 (measured in appropriate units,
e.g., $400 million). Zack was responsible for the largest amount of contamination and
Xerxes the least. If Zack had not acted, the pollution by Xerxes and Yves would have
caused only 300 units of damage. If Xerxes had acted alone, the harm would have been
100 units. Yves acting alone would have caused 200 units of damage. Zack acting alone
would have caused 300 units of damage, and Zack paired with either Xerxes or Yves




c(Z) = c(X,Y) =300
c(X,Z) = c(Y,Z) = c(X,Y,Z) = 400.65
First, we find the Shapley value allocation for Yves. An intuitive approach to the
analysis is to imagine that the damages are apportioned by means of a lottery. The three
polluters are randomly assigned the first, second, or third position in a queue. Starting
with the first person in the queue, payments are made until Wilma recovers the 400 total.
Payments are limited by the amount of damage that a polluter would have caused if he
had acted alone; thus, Yves pays 200 at most. There are six possible outcomes of the
lottery: (X,Y,Z), (X,Z,Y), (Y,X,Z), (Y,Z,X), (Z,X,Y), and (Z,Y,X). Suppose the outcomes
are equally likely. Yves is first with probability (1/3) and pays 200. He is last with
probability (1/3) and pays 0, because Xerxes and Zack would pay the 400 total. Yves is
second behind Xerxes with probability (1/6) and pays 200. Finally, Yves is second behind
                                                                                                                                                                            
64 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 71
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Zack with probability (1/6) and pays 100 (because Zack has already paid 300). These
observations allow us to calculate that the Shapley value allocation for Yves is 116(2/3).66
The Shapley value allocation for Xerxes is 66(2/3) and for Zack it is 216(2/3).
In contrast, the nucleolus yields a payment of 50 by Xerxes, a payment of 125 by
Yves, and a payment of 225 by Zack. This is the allocation that minimizes the
dissatisfaction (in this case, it is easier to think of maximizing satisfaction) of the various
coalitions. Under this allocation the least fortunate coalitions ({X} and {Y,Z}) enjoy a
surplus of 50. The coalition consisting of Xerxes created a cost of c(X) = 100, but only
has to pay 50, and therefore gets a surplus of 50. The coalition of Yves and Zack created a
cost of c(Y,Z) = 400, but only has to pay 350, and therefore gets a surplus of 50. The
other coalitions get a higher surplus: {Y} and {Z} both get a surplus of:
75 = C(Y) – 125 = C(Z) – 225
and {X,Y} and {X,Z} both get a surplus of:
125 = C(X,Y) – 175 = C(X,Z) – 275.
Thus each of the least satisfied coalitions have the same complaint – they got a surplus of
just 50. But there is no way to shift the payments to give every coalition a surplus above
50. Consider that a smaller payment by Xerxes would lead to a higher combined payment
by Yves and Zack – with the result being the surplus of {Y,Z} would fall below 50.
Likewise, raising the surplus to {Y,Z} would necessarily reduce the surplus to Xerxes.
Notice that the Shapley value is not equivalent to the nucleolus because Xerxes gets a
surplus of only 33(1/3) from the Shapley value allocation.
                                                                                                                                                                            
65 I use c( ) rather than v( ) to indicate that a cost not a value is associated with each coalition.
66 (1/3 x 200) + (1/3 x 0) + (1/6 x 200) + (1/6 x 100).
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I do not want to pause yet to compare the merits of the two solutions. It is not
obvious that either apportionment of damages is fairer. The purpose of the example was
to illustrate how the solution concepts are applied. I will move to a more detailed example
drawn from nuisance law to set the stage for a normative evaluation of the two solution
concepts.
The private nuisance problem is a perennial concern in law and economics.67 The
standard analysis was fashioned by Coase, who observed that parties can bargain to
eliminate inefficiencies associated with conflicting uses on neighboring property.68 The
Coase Theorem states that parties will negotiate the efficient solution to a private
nuisance problem if transaction costs are low.69 Further, the solution is independent of the
assignment of property rights.70 I will take the Coasean analysis of private nuisance as a
point of departure for the application of cooperative game solution concepts to the
question of the fair assignment of property rights.
Let me illustrate the issue with a dispute between three parties: Ann, Bob and
Carol. Suppose that Ann is engaged in activity that interferes with the activities of Bob
and Carol. For example, Ann operates a gravel pit that generates dust that bothers Bob
and Carol in their neighboring homes. Alternatively, Ann plays loud music in her home
that bothers neighbors Bob and Carol, or Ann uses a power boat on a public lake in a way
that disturbs Bob and Carol while they are fishing.
To make the problem concrete I suppose that the benefit to Ann from her activity
is 4. Similarly, the benefit to Bob and Carol from their activities if they are disturbed by
                                                          
67 See e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 61-67.
68 See Coase, supra note 34.
69 Id.
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Ann is 4 each. If Bob and Carol are undisturbed, then their benefit rises to 6 each. Ann’s
net benefit falls to 3 if she modifies her activity so that it does not disturb Bob and Carol.
This is enough data to specify a cooperative game and find a solution.71
The traditional Coasean argument in law and economics holds that rights should
be assigned in a way that maximizes efficiency. Here, efficiency requires that Ann refrain
from the activity that diminishes the benefits available to Bob and Carol. If transaction
costs are low, it does not matter how the rights are assigned, because the parties will
negotiate that outcome. Where transaction costs are high, however, the Coasean argument
favors assignment of rights to Bob and Carol. In the following discussion, I assume that
transaction costs are sufficiently low so that efficiency will be achieved regardless of how
property rights are assigned.
The game specification consists of a list of players: A, B and C, and a
characteristic function. The following characteristic function is just one of the possible
functions consistent with the data in this problem.72 The payoff to Ann acting alone is
v(A) = 4. Similarly, the payoffs to Bob or Carol acting alone are v(B) = v(C) = 4 in the
face of Ann’s disruptive activity. If Ann cooperates with either Bob or Carol, then the
joint payoff they can achieve is v(A,B) = v(A,C) = 9. Because Ann can mitigate her harm
at a cost of 1 while the other party gains 2, the net benefit associated with Ann’s activity
falls to 3, but the benefit from the other party’s activity rises to 6.73 The coalition of Bob
and Carol only nets the sum of what they can achieve alone: v(B,C) = 8. Finally, the
                                                                                                                                                                            
70 Id.
71 I use this exercise to build some intuition about how the private nuisance problem should be resolved.
72 I will consider an alternative characteristic function later.
73 A background assumption in this version of cooperative game theory is that utility is transferable between
members of a coalition. Ann’s sacrifice could be induced within the coalition of Ann and Bob by Bob’s
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grand coalition of all three will achieve the highest joint payoff if Ann mitigates her harm.
The result is a net benefit of 3 from Ann’s activity, and 6 from the activities of Bob and
Carol so that v(A,B,C) = 15.
The Shapley value of this game allocates a utility to each player that equals his or
her average marginal contribution to each coalition. The Shapley value for Ann is 51/3. To
check the derivation of this result first notice that Ann contributes 4 to the singleton
coalition {A}. She contributes v(A,B) – v(B) = 5 to the doubleton coalition {A, B}. She
makes the same contribution to the coalition {A, C}. Finally, she contributes v(A,B,C) –
v(B,C) = 7 to the grand coalition {A, B, C}. Ann’s Shapley value is the average of 4, 5,
and 7, or 51/3. Similar calculations for Bob and Carol yield Shapley values of 45/6 for
each.74
The division of benefits given by the Shapley value can be used to guide the
assignment of property rights in this nuisance problem. If Bob and Carol are assigned the
right to be free from interference by Ann and that right can be enforced at no cost, then
Bob and Carol will enjoy their full benefits of 6 each and Ann will get a net benefit of 3.
This pattern of benefits departs considerably from the Shapley value calculations that
would give 51/3 to Ann and 45/6 to Bob and Carol. In fact, assigning a right to Ann to
                                                                                                                                                                            
offer to transfer a benefit of at least 1 to Ann. The nominal net benefits of 3 to Ann and 6 to Bob are not
relevant to the coalition {A,B}; only the payoff v(A,B) = 9 is relevant to the coalition.
74 The reader might expect a different weighting of the marginal contributions. The reader might guess that
since there are four different coalitions that include A (namely, {A}, {A,  B}, {A, C}, and {A, B, C}) each
of these marginal contributions should get a weight of one-fourth. The best explanation for the weighting
used to calculate the Shapley value is based on the following heuristic. Suppose that A, B, and C come
through a door in a random order. We calculate A’s marginal contribution to the coalition of agents who
passed through the door before her. There are six possible orderings: ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, and
CBA. Each order is equally likely, so the marginal contribution in each case is weighted by one-sixth. For
the example in the text: if B comes through the door first (BAC or BCA) the marginal contribution is 4; if B
comes through the door second and follows A (ABC) the marginal contribution is 5; if B comes through the
door second and follows C (CBA) the marginal contribution is 4; and if B comes through the door third
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choose whatever activity she pleases is suggested by the Shapley value calculation. In this
case, efficiency dictates that Bob and Carol make a payment to Ann to induce her to
curtail her interference with their activities. The total gain that the parties can share from
an efficient arrangement is 3.75 Ann should get a payment of at least 1 to compensate for
the mitigation, and Ann could get as much as 3 in payment if she is an extremely
successful bargainer. Thus Ann should enjoy a benefit between 4 and 7 depending on her
bargaining skill. An outcome where each party gets 5 seems plausible76 and is much
closer to the Shapley value.
If cooperative game theory in general and the Shapley value in particular are of
any real value to law professors, it does not lie in Delphic pronouncements about fair
outcomes. Instead, the value must arise from some intuitions about fairness that come
from applying the theory. So far, the analysis supports an allocation of rights in favor of
the polluter (generally the party called upon to mitigate). This is because Ann, the
polluter, offers a valuable contribution to the well-being of neighbors Bob and Carol. If
Ann forbears from polluting, she offers a significant benefit to either Bob or Carol or the
pair, and the Shapley value recognizes that contribution by rewarding her.
It may seem that the Shapley value solution is somehow stacked in favor of the
polluter. In fact, it is. The problem, though, is not with the Shapley value solution
concept; rather, it lies in my specification of the characteristic function. While my
specification was reasonable, it is not the only reasonable specification. I will now revise
                                                                                                                                                                            
(ACB or CAB) the marginal contribution is 6. Thus, the Shapley value for B is: (1/6)4 + (1/6)4 + (1/6) 5 +
(1/6)4 + (1/6)6 + (1/6)6 = 4(5/6).
75 Bob and Carol both get a benefit of 2 while Ann loses 1.
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the characteristic function and recalculate the Shapley value. The result will be a solution
that is more favorable to Bob and Carol. It is important to notice that the specification of
the characteristic function incorporates significant value judgments.
In the first specification of the characteristic function, I assumed that Ann’s
polluting activity was a background condition that could affect any coalition. Now I
reverse that assumption and suppose that the absence of pollution is the background
condition. Recall that originally the singleton coalition consisting of Ann was assigned a
payoff v(A) = 4. Now I reduce that payoff to v(A) = 3. Intuitively, even in isolation Ann
cannot choose the polluting activity without permission. Alternatively, we can interpret
the payoff v(A) = 3 as meaning that Ann by herself only deserves the payoff associated
with her non-polluting activity.77 I assumed that the singleton coalition of Bob or Carol
alone would suffer the harm from Ann’s pollution and so also get a payoff of 4. I now
change that assumption and assume that Bob and Carol alone get a payoff of 6 (so that
v(B) = v(C) = 6). Continuing with the new assumptions, the pair of Bob and Carol would
get a payoff of 12 (so that v(B,C) = 12). The payoff to the other coalitions is unchanged
(so that v(A,B) = v(A,C) = 9 and v(A,B,C) = 15. The Shapley value for this alternative
specification of the characteristic function yields a payoff of 3 to Ann and 6 to Bob and
Carol.78
                                                                                                                                                                            
76 This outcome arises when the parties split the gains from cooperation equally. There is no consensus in
economics about how bargains of this sort are resolved. See generally, MARTIN OSBORNE AND ARIEL
RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS (1990).
77 Still another interpretation is that in the state of nature Bob and Carol can prevent Ann from choosing the
polluting activity by force.
78 Ann makes a marginal contribution of 3 to the singleton coaltion {A}. She makes a marginal contribution
of 3 to either doubleton coalition. And she makes a marginal contribution of 3 to the grand coalition.
Averaging over all 3’s gives an allocation of 3 to Ann. For Bob or Carol, their marginal contributions are 6
to every coalition that they might join, so they each get a Shapley value allocation of 6.
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How do we evaluate which of the alternative specifications of the characteristic
function is correct? In this setting I think that either can be defended. I might choose a
payoff to the singleton coalitions that reflects what each party actually can achieve in
isolation. That might mean that Bob gets 6 because he can intimidate Ann until she abates
the dust from her gravel pit, turns down her music, or keeps her boat from interfering
with the fishing. Of course, the opposite might also be true. Descriptive realism is not
necessarily required or desirable. I might specify that v(B) = 6 because Bob deserves a
benefit of 6 when he stands alone. Finally, I might specify payoffs to coalitions based on
either status quo or hypothetical property rights.
Comparing the Shapley values obtained for the two specifications, we see that
Bob and Carol do better under the new specification. The payoffs yielded by the new
Shapley value match the payoffs that result from giving Bob and Carol the right to be free
from interference by Ann. The difference between the two specifications is that Ann’s
marginal contributions are smaller under the new specification because Bob and Carol do
better without Ann.79 Intuitively, the new analysis models the cooperative problem in a
way that is more sympathetic to the victims of pollution. As a result, the Shapley value
derived from the new specification of the characteristic function gives Bob and Carol a
relatively high allocation. Thus, I reiterate the point I made earlier that a critical issue is
how the analyst abstracts from the context of the problem.80 To a large degree, fairness
analysis depends on how reference points are chosen. One advantage of this formal
approach is that it makes the effect of an analyst’s assumption quite clear.
                                                          
79 Under the new specification Ann contributes 3 to the coalition {A} compared to 4 before, she contributes
3 to the coalitions {A, B} and {A, C} compared to 5 before, and she contributes 3 to the grand coalition {A,
B, C} compared to 7 before.
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Having just stated that fairness analysis depends on reference points to a large
degree, I hasten to add that the choice of solution concept is also very important. The
nucleolus is a leading alternative to the Shapley value as a solution concept for
cooperative games. In some problems the two solution concepts will give similar
outcomes; in other problems they diverge widely. To a large degree, the choice of a
solution concept depends on the analyst’s moral intuition. Once the analyst understands
how different solution concepts work, he or she can make a choice based on which one
more closely comports with the analyst’s moral intuition.
In Part III, I will compare the axiomatic basis of the nucleolus and the Shapley
value, but for now I am content to apply the concepts to the problem at hand and compare
the results. Given the first specification of the characteristic function, the nucleolus yields
a payoff of 5 for Ann and 5 for both Bob and Carol (compared to 51/3 for Ann and 45/6  for
Bob and Carol under the Shapley value). Given the second specification, the nucleolus
yields a payoff of 3 for Ann and 6 for Bob and Carol (the same as under the Shapley
value).
Let me explain the derivation of the nucleolus and why the solution concepts
diverge for the first specification and agree for the second. The nucleolus creates a rough
parity among all coalitions by maximizing satisfaction experienced by each coalition. I
judge satisfaction by comparing the payoffs allocated to the members of a coalition by a
potential solution to the payoff specified for that coalition by the characteristic function.
For example, the nucleolus associated with the first characteristic function allocates a
payoff of 5 to Ann. Her level of satisfaction is the gap between that payoff, and the payoff
                                                                                                                                                                            
80 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 122 (framing effects in bargaining).
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given by the characteristic function v(A) = 4. I will say that her satisfaction level is equal
to 1. For Bob and Carol the satisfaction level is also equal to 1, because the nucleolus
allocates them a payoff of 5 each, whereas the characteristic functions specifies v(B) =
v(C) = 4. Now consider the doubleton coalitions. Ann and Bob together get a payoff of 5
+ 5 = 10 under the nucleolus compared to the payoff of v(A,B) = 9 specified by the
characteristic function. Their satisfaction level is also 1. The same level of satisfaction is
achieved by the coalition of Ann and Carol. The coalition of Bob and Carol gets a
satisfaction level of 2 because together they get 10 under the nucleolus while v(B,C) = 8.
Thus all coalitions get a payoff at least one in excess of their characteristic function
payoff.81 There is no way to rearrange the nucleolus payoffs without forcing some
coalition’s satisfaction level below 1.  Now let’s compare the Shapley value. Ann
receives a higher payment and Bob and Carol receive lower payments compared to the
nucleolus. Obviously, the satisfaction level of the coalitions {B} and {C} fall below 1 to
5/6. Thus the Shapley value allocation decreases the satisfaction level of two of the least
satisfied coalitions. Of course, by its nature, the Shapley value rewards parties based on
their average marginal contribution to all coalitions. In this problem the Shapley value
favors Ann relative to the nucleolus because of Ann’s high marginal contributions. Ann’s
marginal contributions are relatively large because she is needed to abate the pollution in
an efficient outcome.
Why do the two solution concepts yield an identical allocation of surplus in the
second cooperative game problem? To understand the answer it helps to calculate the
satisfaction level of each coalition. First note that all singleton coalitions have a
                                                          
81 Of course, for the grand coalition, {A,B,C}, the sum of the individual nucleolus payoffs is equal to the
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satisfaction level of zero. The reason is that solution payoffs match the payoffs to the
singleton coalitions given by the characteristic function: v(A) = 3, and v(B) = v(C) = 6.
The doubleton coalitions also each have a satisfaction level of zero. The Shapley value
payoffs to Ann and Bob (or Ann and Carol) are 3 + 6 = 9 which matches the characteristic
function payoff: v(A,B) = 9 (or v(A,C) = 9). Similarly, for Bob and Carol 6 + 6 = 12 =
v(B,C). So all coalitions have the same level of zero satisfaction. It is not possible to
rearrange payoffs without shifting some coalition’s satisfaction level to a negative
number. The Shapley value solution and the nucleolus solution coincide here because of
the simple additive structure implied by the characteristic function. Each player’s
marginal contribution to any coalition is constant. Ann brings the value 3 to every
coalition, while Bob and Carol bring the value 6 to every coalition. In this second
cooperative game, when we reward each player based on his or her marginal contribution,
we are also creating parity among all of the possible coalitions.
III. THE AXIOMATIC APPROACH
Reviewing the examples in the last section, it is difficult to choose among the
solution concepts – to prefer one as fairer than the other. One way to develop a preference
for a particular solution is to see how each of the solutions performs over a broad range of
examples. With luck, we will find that one solution consistently gives sensible and
intuitively fair solutions, while another generates enough aberrant solutions that we can
                                                                                                                                                                            
characteristic function payoff: v(A,B,C) = 15. This is always true for a grand coalition.
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reject it as a solution method.82 An instructive , alternative way to choose among solution
concepts requires understanding the origin of each concept in terms of its constitutive
axioms.83
The game theorist specifies a list of axioms that he or she thinks a desirable (for
moral, aesthetic or other reasons) solution concept should satisfy. He or she then checks
to see whether the axioms are consistent with one another. Assuming that the axioms are
consistent, the game theorist checks to see which solution concepts satisfy the axioms. As
more and stronger axioms are added to the list, the odds grow that no solution concept
can satisfy them all. A difficult and happy achievement is to find a minimally sufficient
list of axioms that can be satisfied by only one solution concept. When this axiomatic
characterization of a solution concept is achieved, then it makes sense to identify the
moral significance of a solution concept with the content of its axioms (and the implicit
assumptions hidden in the statement of the problem).
A rough version of the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value states:84 it
is the unique allocation rule that is (i) impartial, (ii) Pareto optimal, and (iii) satisfies the
marginality principle. Impartiality means that the allocation only depends on the relevant
specified information. The allocation cannot depend on factors that are morally arbitrary –
like whose name is shorter. Pareto optimality simply means that all benefits are allocated;
                                                          
82 I am not transgressing my rule against global analysis of fairness issues. I do not mean to suggest that one
fairness rule can either answer all questions about a just society or even that one fairness rule is satisfactory
for all problems of fair division. Rather, I am suggesting that we should make sure that a fair division
method is robust in the sense that it performs well for all plausible division problems in a particular class.
83 See Donald Wittman, The Geometry of Justice: Three Existence and Uniqueness Theorems, 16 THEORY
AND DECISION 239 (1984) for a lucid and accessible presentation of the axiomatic approach to fair division
between two parties. Cf. NORMAN FROLICH AND JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY 156-57 (1992) 156-57 (1992) (expressing skepticism
toward an axiomatic approach to distributive justice).
84 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 200.
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nothing is wasted. In the cost allocation context, Pareto optimality means that the sum of
the allocated costs equals and does not exceed the required cost of the project. The
marginality principle requires that a player’s allocation depends only on that player’s
marginal contributions to all possible coalitions.85
A rough version of the axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus states:86 it is
the unique allocation rule that is (i) impartial, (ii) Pareto optimal, (iii) homogeneous, (iv)
separable, and (v) satisfies the consistency principle. The first two axioms also appear in
the characterization of the Shapley value. The marginality principle in the Shapley value
characterization is replaced in the nucleolus characterization by homogeneity,
separability, and consistency. Costs or benefits are separable if they are solely attributable
to one player. A solution concept satisfies separability if it allocates the separable portion
of cost or benefit to the responsible party. A solution concept is homogeneous when
scaling up costs or benefits scales the allocation in the same way.87 Roughly speaking, a
solution concept is consistent if it gives the same allocation over a group of players when
the number of players in the game is scaled up or down in a regular way.88
The essential differences between the Shapley value and the nucleolus can be
traced to the difference between the marginality principle used to characterize the former
and the consistency principle used to characterize the latter. I will explore the relative
merits of the two axioms by explaining how they can be violated. Specifically, I will
                                                          
85 I will explain this principle further below.
86 See id., at 201-204.
87 The Shapley value satisfies the separability and homogeneity axioms, but they are not needed to
characterize the Shapley value.
88 Since a precise definition is difficult to understand, I will illustrate the consistency principle with an
example below.
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describe why the nucleolus fails the marginality principle and why the Shapley value fails
the consistency principle.
Let me show that the nucleolus violates the marginality principle by returning to
the problem of apportioning damages among three polluters. Recall the goal is to divide
fairly the 400 unit cost of pollution between Xerxes, Yves, and Zack. The cooperative
game specified the following characteristic function: c(0) = 0, c(X) = 100, c(Y) = 200,
c(Z) = 300, c(X,Y) = 300, c(X,Z) = 400, c(Y,Z) = 400, and c(X,Y,Z) = 400. The
marginality principle is built upon the notion of a player’s marginal contribution. A
player’s marginal contribution is measured by the change in the value of a coalition when
the player is removed from the coalition. Thus Xerxes makes a marginal contribution of
100 to the coalition {X,Y} because c(X,Y) – c(Y) = 300 – 200 = 100. Similarly, Xerxes
makes a marginal contribution of 100 to the coalitions {X, Z} and {X}. Finally, Xerxes
makes a marginal contribution of 0 to the coalition {X, Y, Z} because c(X,Y,Z) – c(Y,Z)
=  400 – 400 = 0. The marginality principle dictates that a solution concept gives the same
allocation to a player if that player makes the same marginal contributions in two
different cooperative games.89
To apply the marginality principle, I will modify the pollution cost sharing game
in a way that keeps Xerxes’ marginal contributions constant. The new cooperative game
has the same characteristic function, except c(Y) is reduced from 200 to 100, and c(X,Y)
is reduced from 300 to 200.90 The marginal contributions by Xerxes are the same in the
                                                          
89 The set of players is the same in the two games.
90 In the new game Yves’ costs are symmetric with Xerxes’ costs.
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two games.91 As required, the new Shapley value satisfies the marginality principle
because Xerxes’ cost allocation does not change. The Shapley value allocation to Xerxes
remains 66(2/3), the allocation to Yves falls from 116(2/3) to 66(2/3), and the allocation
to Zack rises from 216(2/3) to 266(2/3). The nucleolus violates the marginality principle
because the cost allocated to Xerxes rises despite the fact his marginal contributions are
unchanged. The nucleolus in the new problem allocates a cost of 66(2/3) to Xerxes
compared to 50 in the original problem.92 This example provides intuitive support for the
marginality axiom because it seems unfair to make Xerxes pay more when his marginal
contributions are unchanged, and the total damage of 400 is unchanged.
The consistency principle is also intuitively appealing, but it points toward the
nucleolus rather than the Shapley value. The consistency principle requires that an
allocation rule yields consistent results when it is applied to one cooperative game that is
derived from another by changing the number of players. I can illustrate the consistency
principle by returning to the first estate division problem.93 Yves had a claim of 200 and
Zack had a claim of 300 to an estate with 300 in assets. Recall that both the nucleolus and
the Shapley value yielded an allocation of 100 for Yves and 200 for Zack.94 Now consider
a similar problem with everything doubled: there are four claimants instead of two; the
assets in the estate are doubled to 600; Yves and new player Yvette each have a claim of
200; and Zack and new player Zeke each have a claim of 300. As one might expect, the
nucleolus allocates 100 to both Yves and Yvette, and 200 to both Zack and Zeke – not so
                                                          
91 In the new problem Xerxes’ marginal contribution to the coalition {X,Y} is still 100 because c(X,Y) –
c(Y) = 200 – 100. The marginal contributions of Xerxes to the coalitions {X}, {X,Z} and {X,Y,Z} are
unchanged in the two problems, because c(0), c(X), c(X,Z), c(Z), c(Y,Z), and c(X,Y,Z) are all unchanged.
92 The allocation to Yves falls from 125 to 66(2/3), and the allocation to Zack rises from 225 to 266(2/3).
93 See text at notes 40-45.
32
the Shapley value. The Shapley value allocation gives 116(2/3) to both Yves and Yvette,
and 183(1/3) to both Zack and Zeke.95 The consistency principle is violated by the
Shapley value as applied to these two fair division problems.
To recapitulate the discussion so far in Part III, the marginality principle and the
consistency principle offer alternative axiomatic bases for constituting a rule of fair
division. If an analyst finds the marginality principle more attractive, then he or she
should choose the Shapley value as a solution concept. If the analyst finds the consistency
principle more attractive, then he or she should choose the nucleolus.
I will conclude this part by describing two desirable properties of fair division
rules: one property is satisfied only by the Shapley value, and the other is not satisfied by
the Shapley value at all.
The first property, which holds only for the Shapley value, is the monotonicity
condition.96 Roughly speaking, when two cooperative games are compared, if the payoffs
of all coalitions are greater in the second game than the first, then the payoffs to all
players must be greater in the second game.97 The nucleolus sometimes violates this
condition. It is possible that external changes that increase the surplus available to
everyone actually reduce some player’s nucleolus payoff. Not only does monotonicity
seems intuitively desirable, it also has political-economic significance. To the extent that
legal policy represents a fair bargain among interest groups, it is desirable that the bargain
does not have to be reworked in the face of exogenous social or economic changes. An
exogenous change that increases total surplus may reduce some player’s nucleolus payoff.
                                                                                                                                                                            
94 Given the characteristic function with v(Y) = 200 and v(Z) = 300.
95 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 71.
96 The marginality principle is the key to assuring that the monotonicity condition is satisfied.
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Such an event would provoke demands for revision of the sharing rule to protect the
player that suffers.98 This type of problem is avoided by the Shapley value.
The second desirable property concerns the temptation of coalitions to defect from
a joint enterprise. The nucleolus is preferable to the Shapley value on the grounds that the
nucleolus is more resistant to threats of defection. The nucleolus is designed to minimize
the dissatisfaction of each coalition. It gives every coalition a payoff greater than the
coalition’s characteristic function payoff – whenever that is possible.99 The same cannot
be said of the Shapley value.
The following example illustrates a problem of defection that afflicts the Shapley
value but not the nucleolus.100 Suppose that three communities, A, B, and C, agree to
build and share a waste-water treatment facility. The characteristic function specifies the
benefit to each coalition of communities from building the facility on their own. Suppose
the characteristic function gives the following payoffs:
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) =2
v(A,B) = v(A,C) = 5
v(B,C) = 7
v(A,B,C) = 9.
                                                                                                                                                                            
97 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 200.
98 See ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 121-22.
99 An economic concept called the core is useful here. The core is defined to be the set of feasible
allocations that cannot be blocked by the objection of some coalition. Any coalition that can do better on its
own that it does with a suggested allocation is allowed to object. Intuitively, the core is the set of allocations
that are resistant to defection. See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 403-06; YOUNG, supra note 12, at 85.
Unfortunately, the core does not exist for all cooperative games. In other words, for some cooperative
games, at least one coalition will object to any possible allocation. The nucleolus is especially resistant to
defection because it is defined in such a way that it is always in the core if the core exists. See id., at 201-02.
100 For similar examples see MOULIN, supra note 11, at 24-25; YOUNG, supra note 12, at 82-84.
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The communities clearly benefit from cooperation since each pair of communities and the
coalition of all three communities get benefits that exceed the sum of the benefits when
the communities are on their own. The Shapley value allocation for this problem gives a
payoff of 21/3 to community A, and 31/3 to communities B and C. A weakness of the
Shapley value in this setting is that communities B and C could defect from the three
community project and get a higher payoff on their own: the Shapley value gives the pair
31/3  + 31/3 = 62/3 compared to v(B,C) = 7. The nucleolus for this cooperative game gives
community A a payoff of 2, and communities B and C get payoffs of 31/2 each. B and C
do as well under the nucleolus as they could do on their own. No coalition has an
incentive to defect under the nucleolus allocation.
 Defection is obviously relevant to fair division problems in which players
voluntarily participate in a joint enterprise.101 It deserves attention, but is less relevant in
fair division problems in which participation is mandated by the government. Voluntary
participation is present for many collective decisions like the water treatment project.
Other examples include international economic and environmental treaties, joint ventures,
and partnerships. There is no point embracing an allocation method as fair if some
players object to their allocation102 and actually leave the joint enterprise.103 In most of
                                                          
101 The reader should notice that I am mingling normative and positive theory here. Cooperative games and
their solutions concern how a group should divide costs or benefits. Whether members of a group can and
will defect is a positive question. The link that I am drawing is based on the notion that defection will not
occur if every coalition is doing as well under the solution of the game as they could on their own.
Economists use the core to examine this link.
102 There is an easy way to defend an allocation as fair even though it is vulnerable to defection. If players
view an allocation as fair, then they might remain with a joint venture despite an incentive to defect. In
other words, the commitment to participate in a fair venture may outweigh a monetary interest in defection.
103 Notice that defection is not always a problem with the Shapley value. Recall the earlier discussion of the
bidder cartel which settled on the Shapley value as a fair way to distribute the gains from collusion. That
cartel was remarkably resistant to defection. The important point is that the very construction of the
nucleolus assures that coalition dissatisfaction is minimized.
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the fair division problems discussed in this review, the allocation is mandated and players
do not have an option of leaving the joint enterprise. Nevertheless, there is a normative
argument that the nucleolus is desirable because it is consistent with a goal of autonomy
since coalitions receive an allocation that is at least as good as what they can achieve on
their own (when this is possible). A sensible rejoinder to the autonomy argument is that
sometimes it is just for one coalition to subsidize another. The universal service
requirement in public utility regulation is a prominent example of a mandated subsidy
policy.104
IV. FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY
Moulin and Young address two main criticisms of the use of cooperative game
theory or other notions of end-state justice to guide legal policy-making. The first
criticism holds that fair division of cost or benefit ignores economic efficiency. The
second criticism holds that fair division should be assessed with reference to procedural
rather than end-state justice. The authors are sensitive to both criticisms and believe that
end-state analysis must accommodate concerns about efficiency and process. In this part
of the Review I will mention some of the highlights of analysis that combines efficiency
with end-state justice. In the next part of the Review I will discuss fair process.
Two efficiency issues frequently arise in fair division problems. One is the
problem of shirking. I use that term broadly to cover both the free-rider problem105 and
                                                          
104 See ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 134, 203-10.
105 Free-riding occurs when people who benefit from a public good avoid paying for it. See MOULIN, supra
note 11, at 27, 340.
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the moral hazard problem.106 Generally, the issue is whether parties will take private
actions that optimally advance a joint project. The other efficiency issue concerns
strategic misrepresentation of information by parties holding private information.107
Self-interested parties usually will not take optimal actions to advance the
common good. They tend to shirk their responsibility because they personally bear the
cost of effort,  resource contribution, or investment in the joint project. The government
can eliminate the free-rider problem through coercion, and firms can mitigate or eliminate
the problem by building cooperative institutions like joint ventures or trade associations.
Moral hazard can also be eliminated, provided that inefficient actions can be observed
and verified. Governmental fiat or private contract can assure efficient action given
observability and verifiability.108
If a public good like a dam is funded by voluntary contributions there is likely to
be an inefficiently low level of funding. In this setting, free-riders are users who benefit
from the dam, but contribute less than their fair share to the cost of the dam. If the
government provides the dam, then governmental fiat eliminates the free rider problem.
The government can use general tax revenues or user fees to fund the project. Here,
reliance on distributive justice to divide fairly the cost of the dam avoids the shirking
problem.
Yet many public goods are provided by the private sector without serious shirking
problems. Suppose, for example, three oil companies hire an exploration company to
                                                          
106 Moral hazard occurs when a person deviates from an agreed course of action and takes an action that
advances personal interests. See ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 60-61.
107 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 130-31.
108 Economists apply the term observable to information shared by the parties to a contract. They apply the
term verifiable to information shared by the parties and the trier of fact at trial.
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investigate oil deposits at a remote site. The companies agree they will share the resulting
information. The companies certainly care about the incentive effects of their contract
with the exploration company. But efficiency issues recede when it comes to dividing the
cost of this simple joint venture. The companies are likely to use some fairness criterion
to guide their decision about how they will share the cost of compensating the exploration
company. The companies can handle the free-rider problem with a contract that binds
them to sharing the compensation cost.109
The power of contract is also a key to assuring efficient actions are taken in the
presence of moral hazard. Moral hazard is an issue in the nuisance problem in Part II
because the polluter has an incentive to cheat on an agreement to abate her polluting
activity. In my earlier discussion I used fairness criteria to assign property rights without
regard to possible inefficiencies. Assuming the victims can observe the polluting action,
the parties will set the optimal level of abatement by contract. Following Coase, if
transaction costs are sufficiently low, then contract rights, not property rights, assure
efficiency.
Shirking and similar problems occur when actions are unobservable. The
government cannot assure compliance with regulations, and private parties cannot assure
compliance with contracts if relevant actions cannot be observed. Inefficiency, however,
is not inevitable. Optimal actions can still be induced if parties are provided the right
incentives.
                                                          
109 More precisely, the availability of contract law diminishes the impact of free-riding. Although the
contract between the three companies deters free-riding after an agreement, there is still a temptation to free
ride by refusing to sign an agreement or by demanding a small cost share.
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The sharing rules in a joint project can be chosen to ameliorate undesirable
incentives for parties to choose inefficient activities. For example, if a party’s share of the
benefit from a joint venture depends indirectly on his or her effort, that creates a positive
incentive to exert effort. Equal benefit-sharing in partnership does not give partners much
of an incentive to exert effort that will contribute to the partnership’s profit. If sharing is
proportional to an indirect measure of effort like attracting new clients, then a greater and
more efficient incentive is provided. The main problem with unobservable actions is that
sharing rules that provide proper incentives often clash with sharing rules that assure a
fair end-state.110
Strategic misrepresentation of private information is the second efficiency
problem. I alluded to this problem in the second estate division example.111 An efficient
allocation scheme should give the painting left in the estate to the party who values it the
most. I assumed that the priest knew who valued the painting the most, and even the
precise value both Yves and Zack attached to the painting. Often such information will
not be available and there is a danger of misallocation. The efficiency loss is measured by
the gap between the highest value user and the player who actually receives the item. The
inefficiency can be alleviated if the parties can trade items once they are allocated. If trade
is possible, then the inefficiency cost is reduced to the cost of the transaction.
Another danger created by the information revelation problem is that the decision
whether to build a public project like a dam, and also the size of the project, may be
distorted. If users know that their payment for the dam will be proportional to their
benefit, then they have an incentive to understate their benefit. If the government believes
                                                          
110 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 22 and sections 6.4 and 6.5.
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the understated valuations, then it could mistakenly decide to cancel a project or reduce
its scale because costs appear large in comparison to benefits.
Private information does not always create efficiency problems.112 Some people
will report their private information honestly regardless of the consequences to
themselves. Other people are deterred from lying because they fear getting caught and the
resulting shame or punishment. Deterrence requires some probability that liars are
detected and punished. This is not possible with some kinds of information that cannot be
verified in court; e.g., how strongly a person desires a public good. Even when detection
is not feasible or effective, sharing rules are another source of incentives for truth-
telling.113
In the following example the sharing rule achieves both the fairness and efficiency
goals. Consider a public project that will serve Ann, Bob, and Carol. The expected
benefits to each party from an optimally designed project are equal. Suppose that there are
two design choices: X or Y. Further suppose that there are two possible states of the
world: x or y, and that Ann and Bob observe the true state of the world, while Carol and
the government manager in charge of the project simply know that x and y are equally
likely. Assume that choice X is optimal given x is the true state of the world. Similarly, Y
is optimal given y. Finally, assume that Ann prefers project X and Bob prefers project Y
regardless of the true state of the world. The problem for the manager is to fairly assign
                                                                                                                                                                            
111 See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
112 The collusive bidders at the used machinery auction dealt with the information revelation problem
effectively. They chose a mechanism that induced the high value party to identify themselves. The
mechanism also implemented the Shapley value allocation of the gains from collusion. See Graham et al.,
supra note 58.
113 There is a vast literature in economics that addresses the goal of getting parties to reveal their (private)
preference information concerning a public good. See e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, FUNDAMENTALS OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 112-131 (1988).
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the costs of the project and induce Ann and Bob truthfully to reveal their information.
There is a simple sharing rule that is fair and induces truthfulness. If Ann and Bob report
the same state of the world, then the manager should believe their reports and choose the
product design that is optimal for the reported state. The costs of the project are divided
equally between Ann, Bob, and Carol. If Ann and Bob make inconsistent reports, then the
manager should randomly choose a product design and divide the costs of the project
equally between just Ann and Bob. The equilibrium outcome consists of truthful reports,
optimal project design, and equal cost sharing, despite the private information and the
conflicting interests of Ann and Bob.114
There is no consensus about how conflicting fairness and efficiency imperatives
should be resolved. Moulin believes there is frequent conflict between the goals of
efficiency and fairness.115 When conflict is inescapable he favors an intuitive balancing
between the two interests.116  Young believes that the degree of conflict is overstated, and
that fairly assigning entitlements in the context of competitive markets is often the best
approach to public policy.117 Generally, law and economics scholars shy away from a
serious analysis of fairness issues when efficiency is a concern. The usual justification is
that particular policies can be designed on the basis of efficiency. If the result is an unfair
                                                          
114 The following numbers can be used to illustrate the example. The cost of the project is 9. The benefit to
Carol when the project design matches the state is 9. The benefit to Carol is 0 otherwise. The benefit to Ann
is: 10 if the state is x and the design is X; 9 if the state is y and the design is X; 8 if the state is y and the
design is Y; and 6 if the state is x and the design is Y. The benefit to Bob is: 8 if the state is x and the design
is X; 6 if the state is y and the design is X; 10 if the state is y and the design is Y; and 9 if the state is x and
the design is Y. The equilibrium reports of Ann and Bob will be the true state. All three get an expected
payoff of 6.
115 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 22 (discussing the tension between efficiency and equity).
116 See id., at 163 (endorses an approach to fair division that defines “reasonable tests of equity, selecting as
often as possible a small subset of efficient and ‘just’ outcomes.”)
117 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 161 (stating the trade-off is “largely chimerical”); id. at 19 (justifying
competitive markets with fairly defined entitlements as equitable).
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distribution of wealth, then society can address that problem via government taxes and
transfers.118 I agree with Moulin and Young that fairness and efficiency issues should be
faced as they arise, but that topic is too complex for me to comment on here.119
V. FAIR PROCESS
Fair outcomes are the main concern of both authors, but they both recognize that
fairness depends on means as well as ends, and they both comment at length on economic
analysis of procedural fairness.120 Most of the economic interest in process relates to
implementation of a fair end-state allocation.121 Courts, legislatures, and arbitrators face
constraints in implementing fair end-states because they have limited knowledge and
power. Economic analysis is used to derive processes that implement desired end-states
                                                          
118 Compare Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income,” 23 J. Legal Stud. 667 (1994) (Argue the income redistribution policies
should be done through the tax system not legal rules. The problem with legal rules is that redistributional
policies are likely to be directly inefficient in the market affected by the legal rule and indirectly inefficient
through their impact on the labor-leisure choice. In contrast, the income tax only distorts the labor-leisure
choice.); Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable
View, USC Law School, Working Paper No. 98-21 (June 1998) (The Kaplow and Shavell result is not
robust to various changes in their modeling assumptions. Particular attention is paid to heterogeneity of
tortfeasors.)
119 There are three problems with the usual approach to fairness in law and economics. First, fairness is
manifest in dimensions other than wealth or income inequality. I doubt that fiscal policy is the appropriate
venue to address fairness issues raised by most of the fair division problems discussed earlier in this review.
Second, political reality may favor interventions for the sake of fairness at the level of particular policies
rather in the general fiscal policy arena. Third, the claim that fairness can be assured more efficiently
through fiscal policy is open to challenge. Id.
120 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 36-44; YOUNG, supra note 12, at 130-45.
121 For an extensive discussion of “cake-cutting” methods that can be used to implement fair outcomes see
generally BRAMS AND TAYLOR, supra note 50 (Cake-cutting requires that one party divides resources that
will be shared. The other party or parties get first choice among the allotments of resources. The name
comes from the just solution parents use to settle distributional fights among children.) See also Moulin,
supra note 24, at 2-3, 11-12 (Economists study fair procedure by specifying a game that implements a
social choice. The “rights” of a player in the game are modeled as the set of actions available to the player
under the rules of the game.) The concept of implementation is explained in KEN BINMORE, FUN AND
GAMES: A TEXT ON GAME THEORY 531 (1992).
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despite these constraints. Alternatively, economic analysis is used to show what ends are
feasible given limited knowledge and power.122
In the second estate division problem I skirted the question of implementation by
supposing that the priest knew the valuations that Yves and Zack attached to the painting.
In fact, there is a simple auction process that implements the end-state in which Yves
takes the painting and pays $200 to Zack.123 The priest simply puts the painting up for
public auction and lets Yves and Zack split the proceeds. Yves would submit a winning
bid of $400, take the painting, and pay half of the winning bid to Zack.
The preceding example shows that sometimes a fair end-state can be implemented
despite private information. Closer attention to the example reveals another potential
implementation problem: a wealth constraint. If Yves has wealth less than $200, the
supposed transfer is not feasible. The outcome of the public auction would be an
inefficient sale to a third party, and Yves and Zack would split the proceeds of $400.
A third implementation difficulty is caused by collusion between the players.124
Recall the discussion of the allocation of pollution damages between Xerxes, Yves, and
Zack. For heuristic purposes I suggested that the Shapley value could be interpreted in
terms of a lottery that determined the order in which the players made payments to satisfy
the damage claim. For example, whoever draws the shortest straw makes the first
payment. Whoever draws the longest straw makes the last payment (if any payment is still
required after the first two). One problem with this lottery approach is that Xerxes and
                                                          
122 Cf., Roger Myerson & Mark Satterthwaite, “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,” 29 J. ECON.
THEORY 265 (1983) (impossibility of finding a bargaining mechanism that is voluntary, unsubsidized, and
leads to trade if and only if trade is efficient).
123 The task of implementing the end-state in which both Yves and Zack get a payoff of 5 is more difficult.
124 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 79.
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Zack have an incentive to collude.125 In an effective collusive agreement Xerxes would
always take Zack’s straw if Zack had a shorter straw. In return, Zack would compensate
Xerxes for the extra expense. The result of the collusion is to shift more of the damages
to Yves.126
In addition to the implementation problem, Moulin and Young use economic
methods to analyze particular processes.127 They choose candidate fair division processes
and analyze their efficiency and end-state justice attributes. The fairness of a particular
process is assessed by factors like: do players have an individual or group incentive to
lie;128 are players coerced;129 are players ignored; and can one player dictate the
outcome.130 In some examples an apparently fair process may be inefficient131 or lead to a
patently unfair end-state.132 In other examples, it is possible to achieve a degree of
fairness in both process and outcome as well as efficiency. I will illustrate the combined
analysis of process, outcome and efficiency with brief comments on Moulin’s treatment
of voting rules.133
                                                          
125 Alternatively, Xerxes and Yves could collude against Zack.
126 Yves would have to pay 16(2/3) more because of the collusion. Xerxes and Zack could agree to any split
of the cost savings.
127 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 42-63 (legislative apportionment), 156-61 (assignment of students to
dormitory rooms); MOULIN, supra note 11, at 205-13 (divide and choose and auctions).
128 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 40, 195.
129 As I explained in Part III when participation in the joint project is voluntary the end-state must be chosen
so that no coalition of players has an incentive to defect from the grand coalition. In other words, the end-
state must be in the core. Players must be coerced to accept an allocation outside of the core. See supra
notes 92-93.
130 See MOULIN, supra note 24, at 7-8.
131 See infra text accompanying notes 124-25.
132 See MOULIN, supra note 24, at 7 (Fair procedures can produce unfair outcomes. In some cases the
voluntary provision of a public good results in all costs of provision falling to one party. Also “in the
celebrated ‘gloves market’ with 101 owners of a right glove and 100 owners of a left glove the unique core
allocation gives all the surplus to the left glove owners.”)
133 Young has an extensive treatment of a market-like process. See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 151-61. He
argues that when there are different kinds of items to allocate and people have diverse preferences over
those items then it is important to try to achieve an efficient allocation, and that the market is often an
attractive method of achieving fair and efficient allocations. See id. at 161. (“Competitive markets allocate
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Moulin compares two arguably fair voting schemes that might be used to resolve a
social choice problem. The social choice concerns the provision of a public good. In one
of Moulin’s examples he supposes that a group of five neighbors who live in adjoining
condominiums decide to share the joint cost of hiring a gardener to care for a garden.134
The neighbors are assumed to combine equal cost sharing, a notion of end-state justice,
with either majority or unanimity voting as a fair process for eliciting preference
information. Although unanimity voting respects a voluntary participation constraint,
majority voting is more efficient.135
Moulin illustrates the problem by supposing that the garden gives the neighbors
the following benefits in dollars: $800, $600, $450, $350, and $300 for a total value of
$2500. The cost of the gardener is $2000, so the project is efficient if the benefits are
commensurable and weighted equally. Equal cost sharing of $400 implies that two of the
neighbors will suffer a loss. The project will not be undertaken given a unanimous voting
rule. Two of the neighbors will object to the project because they would have to pay more
than they get. In contrast, the project will be approved using a majority voting rule with
equal cost sharing. The vote would be three in favor and two opposed. So majority voting
leads to an efficient outcome while unanimity does not.
Majority voting does not always yield efficiency. If the resident holding the value
of $450 is assigned a lower value of $350, then an inefficient result occurs. The total
                                                                                                                                                                            
property both efficiently and equitably provided the goods were equitably allocated to begin with.”) Id.
Assuming rationality, people will trade from their initial endowments in a way that makes everyone better
off. We see market-like forces in action when children trade food from their school lunch.
134 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 23-24.
135 See id., at 325. A different approach studied in the same chapter is voluntary contribution to the
production of the public good. Like the two voting procedures, voluntary contribution usually leads to
inefficiently low levels of production, but it is not systematically lower than the level under the voting
procedures. Id. at 339-49.
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value of a gardener is now $2400 and the garden’s value still exceeds its cost, but a
majority of residents now oppose the plan. A possible remedy for this inefficiency is to
change the cost sharing rule. In the original problem, if costs are shared proportionally to
benefits then the costs are allocated: (640, 480, 360, 280, 240). The neighbors will now
unanimously vote for to hire the gardener, if and only if it is efficient to do so. Of course,
the allure of the proportional rule fades once we recall that the residents have an incentive
to understate their benefit to reduce their cost share.136
CONCLUSION
I conclude with brief remarks on a bothersome question: If these books are so
valuable for legal scholarship, why aren’t they read and cited more often by legal scholars
– after all, they were written four and five years ago? There are two plausible answers to
that question, but only one that I can accept. First, the methods of cooperative
microeconomics are too hard to apply and the results obtained from these methods are too
weak to be interesting. Second, this subfield of microeconomic theory is relatively
obscure and no one has noticed its potential usefulness in law and economics. Of course, I
favor the second answer.
The purpose of this review was to introduce the methods of cooperative
microeconomics to an audience of legal scholars. The task was fairly easy because so
many of the canonical problems studied by Moulin and Young are directly relevant to
legal policy. The examples I have presented in this Review are certainly accessible to
                                                          
136 With equal cost sharing no one has an incentive to lie. Cf. YOUNG, supra note 12, at 23 (proportional
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non-economists and at the same time they offer rich insights into problems of fair
division. With a nascent interest in fairness appearing in law and economics the time is
ripe to apply cooperative game theory and other methods from cooperative
microeconomics to the study of legal policy.
                                                                                                                                                                            
rule might create bad incentives).
